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Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the economic consequences of terrorism have attracted wide public and scholarly attention. The global 'war on terror' has led to tightened security almost around the world, increasing the costs of conducting international business. Many are concerned that international trade, an important component of the global economy, will suffer due to terrorism and counter-terrorism. A 2003 report, prepared by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and delivered at an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) trade and security forum in Bangkok in 2003, estimated that the United States economy is losing up to US$75 billion a year because of terrorism. The popular view is that terrorism leads to lost business. Several econometric studies (Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004; Fratianni and Kang, 2006; Blomberg and Hess, 2006) demonstrate that terrorism reduces the volume of trade. According to these studies, a doubling in the number of terrorist incidents in two countries of a dyad is associated with a decrease in bilateral trade by about 4 percent. The presence of terrorism together with internal and external conflict is equivalent to as much as a 30 percent tariff on trade in a given country year. And the negative effect of terrorism for trade is stronger for contiguous countries.
In this chapter, I re-examine the effect of terrorism on trade. Previous studies have ignored the direction of terrorist attacks, failed to control for dyad-specific unobserved characteristics, and treated pairs of countries at different development stages equally. This research corrects for these issues. I investigate both the impact of the total number of terrorist events within countries and the effect of terrorist attacks between citizens of two countries in a dyad. I also test the implications of controlling for dyad-specific unobservables, political ties between governments of country pairs and subsamples based on development stage. Using the same data of annual bilateral trade flows from 1968 to 2000, I find no consistent evidence that the total number of terrorist incidents within countries reduces bilateral trade flows, once controlling for dyad-specific unobservables or across subsamples of different development stages. But bilateral terrorist attacks reduce trade in country pairs that involve at least one advanced economy. Overall the econometric evidence is too weak to support the view that transnational terrorism on average reduces bilateral trade flows. The findings suggest caution in understanding and estimating the impact on transnational terrorism on international commerce.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the logic of why terrorism reduces trade, as identified in the literature, and further develops the implication that conventional logic ought to lead one to expect that bilateral terrorist attacks reduce bilateral trade flows. The third section presents the empirical methodology and data, and fourth section discusses the findings. The final section conjectures why terrorism may not consistently reduce bilateral trade, and concludes the chapter.
HOW DO TERRORIST INCIDENTS AFFECT BILATERAL TRADE?
Terrorism is argued to reduce the volume of trade through several mechanisms (Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004; Fratianni and Kang, 2006; Blomberg and Hess, 2006) . First, because terrorism threatens human life, it increases the sense of insecurity among the public. Consequently, it leads to changes in consumption and production patterns in the economy and disrupts existing business plans. Tourism, shopping and business investment may all be affected. The costs of doing business and risks for firms will rise, and the appeal of the market to international traders and producers will decline. Second, to deal with terrorism, governments have to strengthen security measures, which often involve extensive inspections and sometimes border shutdowns. This obviously will cause delays in the delivery of traded goods and increase the expenses of conducting trade. Home transactions may be substituted for international commerce. And trade may also be diverted toward countries with less demanding border inspections.
1 Third, terrorism may directly damage traded goods, either as collateral damage or as the target of terrorist attacks. Consequently, trading costs and the volume of trade will decline.
If one accepts the above logic in the literature, further implications can be inferred. A widely used definition of terrorism is the premeditated or threatened use of extra-normal violence or force to obtain a political, religious or ideological objective through the intimidation of a large audience (for example, Sandler, 1999, 2002) . The focus of previous research and this analysis has been on transnational terrorism. Terrorist attacks in one country become transnational when they involve victims, perpetrators, targets or institutions of another country. Based on the incident venue, transnational terrorist incidents can involve: (1) terrorist attacks initiated by foreign terrorists against some domestic target in a country; (2) attacks by domestic terrorists against some foreign target in a country; or (3) attacks by foreign terrorists against some other foreign target in a country. Therefore, many terrorist incidents involve perpetrators from one country against victims of another or several others.
Following the theoretical logic in the literature, direct attacks between citizens of two countries should have an even clearer negative effect on bilateral trade flows. In addition to working through the above theoretical mechanisms, direct attacks between citizens of two countries may be the result of strained relations and ought to generate further animosity between their citizens. As citizens are consumers, producers and traders, they may be reluctant to trade with citizens of another country who may turn out to be terrorist perpetrators against themselves. Furthermore, governments are more likely to target security measures and counter-terrorist efforts at the citizens of countries of terrorist perpetrators. Finally, where state-sponsored terrorism is involved, governments may strengthen export controls and exchange sanctions against each other.
For example, the fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers of 9/11 were Saudi Arabians has not only strained political and economic relations between US and Saudi Arabia but also generated wide criticism among the America public against Saudi Arabia. The US bombing of Libya and the US invasion of Iraq are also cases in point. Therefore, if one accepts the logic in the literature, it is plausible to expect that terrorist attacks exchanged between citizens of two countries in a dyad should have a negative effect on their bilateral trade flows. One may even argue that where the focus of analysis is bilateral trade flows, the effect of bilateral terrorist attacks on trade ought to be even stronger and more relevant than that of the total numbers of terrorist incidents within countries in general. Bilateral trade flows are directly affected by relations between citizens of the two countries. In contrast, the total numbers of terrorist incidents within countries in general often reflects the general risk environments in these countries. The direct empirical implication of the logic in the literature is that bilateral terrorist attacks reduce bilateral trade flows.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA
To test the effect of terrorism on trade, I employ the gravity model of international trade, as in Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) , Fratianni and Kang (2006) and Blomberg and Hess (2006) . International trade economists usually employ the gravity model to estimate the normal level of trade between states (Aitken, 1973; Anderson, 1979; Deardorff, 1998; Frankel, 1997) . The model posits that bilateral trade is a function of incomes, populations and distance between countries.
Following earlier work on the impact of terrorism on trade, I also employ the gravity model specification of Glick and Rose (2002) and Rose (2004) as well as their data for the sake of comparison, with some slight modifications. The empirical model is specified as follows:
The gravity model variables are defined as those in Rose (2004) . TRADE ij,t+1 is the average value of real bilateral trade between countries i and j at time t 1 1; GDP is real GDP; POP is population; Distance is the distance between i and j; Language is a dummy variable indicating that i and j share a common language; Border is a dummy variable indicating that i and j share a land border; Landlocked is the number of landlocked countries in the country pair; Island is the number of island nations in the country pair; Area is the area of a country in square kilometers; CommonColonizer indicates that i and j shared the same colonizer after 1945; Current-Colonial-Tie indicates that i and j are colonies at time t; FormerColonial-Tie indicates that i and j were ever in a colonial relationship; RTA is a dummy variable indicating that i and j belong to the same regional trade agreement; GSP (US Generalized System of Preferences) is a dummy variable indicating that i extends the GSP to j or vice versa; Currency is a dummy indicating that i and j use the same currency; T denotes the set of year fixed effects dummy variables; e ij,t denotes the error term. The two terrorism variables are defined as follows. ln(Terror i *Terror j ) t is the log of product of (1 1 the number of terrorist incidents) in countries i and j, respectively, as in previous work (for example, Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004) . ln(Terror ijt ) is the number of attacks perpetrated by citizens of the two countries against each other as victims. Data are from the ITERATE database (Mickolus et al., 2002) . Following the logic of the literature, we should expect both terrorism variables to reduce bilateral trade flows.
The model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered over dyad. None of the previous econometric studies (Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004; Fratianni and Kang, 2006; Blomberg and Hess, 2006) has modeled the influence of dyad-specific unobservables. Cheng and Wall (2005) , however, have demonstrated that in the gravity model of trade, it is important to control for heterogeneity in bilateral country-pair fixed effects. Failing to control for such heterogeneity leads to overestimated effects of the right-hand side variables. To examine whether past models are sensitive to this possible confounding effect, I also estimate models that control for dyad fixed effects.
Another modeling difference in this analysis is that the dependent variable is one year, leading the independent variables to allow terrorist incidents some time to affect traders and to control for possible reverse causality. Previous research has the dependent variable contemporaneous with the independent variables. In robustness tests, I will also use the contemporaneous trade variable. OLS year fixed specification applied by previous empirical studies. Results for the gravity model variables are consistent with both model expectations and previous research findings. Geographic distance hinders bilateral trade flows, and both real GDPs and real GDPs per capita increase the volume of bilateral trade. Furthermore, regional trade agreement joint membership, GSP concession within a dyad, currency union membership, common language, land contiguity, the number of island nations in the dyad, and historical and current colonial ties all have statistically significant and positive impact on bilateral trade, consistent with expectations. Also as expected, the number of landlocked countries in the dyad and the log product of land areas in the dyad are negatively associated with trade. The model also demonstrates good fit for data, explaining about 66 percent of the variations in bilateral trade flows. These results indicate that this is a reasonably well-specified model. We are most interested in the effects of the terrorism variables in model 1. The log product of the numbers of terrorist incidents of two countries in a dyad is the same variable employed in Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) . Its effect is identical to that in Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) in terms of sign and significance, but the size of effect is slightly larger. The effect is statistically significant and negative, and the coefficient −0.07 indicates that a doubling in the number of terrorist incidents (that is, a 100 percent increase) will lead to a decline in bilateral trade by 7 percent, all else being equal.
FINDINGS
The second terrorism variable, however, the number of terrorist attacks between citizens of two countries in a dyad, produces a somewhat surprising finding that is inconsistent with the commonly held logic. The number of terrorist attacks between countries has a statistically significant but positive impact on bilateral trade. The size of the coefficient (0.125) is very large, indicating that a 100 percent increase in the number of terrorist attacks between two countries is associated with a 12.5 percent rise in bilateral trade flows.
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Model 2 in Table 10 .1 additionally controls for dyad fixed effects with dyad-specific intercepts. This dyad fixed effect within estimator controls for dyad-specific unobserved attributes following Cheng and Wall (2005) , and it also allows the analyst to focus on temporal variations, that is, how changes in terrorist incidents affect changes in bilateral trade flows. Since the estimator does not permit time-invariant dyad-specific variables, variables such as common language, distance, and so on are excluded from model 2.
In model 2, the log product of the numbers of terrorist incidents of two countries in a dyad now no longer has any statistically significant impact on bilateral trade flows. The size of the effect is much smaller than that in model 1. While the finding is puzzling, and we will turn to it in the next section, it is clear that the number of terrorist incidents within countries no longer reduces trade once dyad-specific unobservables attributes are controlled for.
The effect of the bilateral terrorist attacks also is statistically insignificant. On the one hand, the result is not surprising given that the dyad-specific fixed effects absorb the variations to be explained by this dyadic terrorist attack variable. On the other hand, the fact that it turns insignificant once we control for dyad-specific unobserved attributes indicates that the effect of bilateral terrorist attacks on trade flows is probably not very strong. Models 1 and 2 in Table 10 .1 produce surprising findings with respect to the effect of terrorism on trade. One may wonder whether the results are spurious. It is possible that the dyadic terrorist attacks variable captures the influence of other dyadic political variables that have been found to affect trade. For example, states that share common interests tend to trade more with each other (Dixon and Moon, 1993; Morrow et al., 1998 Morrow et al., , 1999 . This is because traders expect less political risk to future trade and the transaction costs are lower (Pollins, 1989; Morrow et al., 1998 Morrow et al., , 1999 . Alliance contributes to the increase in bilateral trade under a bipolar system, but not under a multipolar system (Gowa, 1989; Gowa and Mansfield, 1993; Mansfield and Bronson, 1997) . Military conflict reduces bilateral trade (Li and Sacko, 2002) .
Models 3 and 4 in Table 10 .1 present the results of controlling for military alliance, dyadic military dispute and common political interests, as suggested by the political science literature. Data are from Eugene (Bennett and Stam, 1999) . The two models produce results for the terrorism variables that are consistent with those in models 1 and 2. The total number of terrorist incidents in countries reduces trade in model 3 (without controlling for dyad fixed effects), but the effect is statistically insignificant in model 4 (after controlling for dyad fixed effects). As in model 1, dyadic terrorist attacks are positively associated with trade in model 3; but as in model 2, the effect is statistically not different from zero in model 4.
One may plausibly argue that countries at different development stages have different trade patterns. Trade among less-developed countries (LDCs) is relatively smaller than that among advanced economies or between less-developed and advanced economies. Since trade flows among less-developed countries are relatively small to begin with, the risk of terrorism for trade may not result in large behavioral changes by traders. In contrast, the volume of trade is relatively large in country pairs that involve advanced economies. In this context, the risk of terrorism is likely to lead to larger changes in the volume of trade.
To assess the possible confounding impact of development stages, models in Table 10 .1 are re-estimated for two subsamples -the non-OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) country pairs and the OECD-OECD or OECD-LDC country pairs. The results are presented in Tables 10.2 and 10 .3, where models in for subsamples 
Notes:
Robust t statistics (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. for control for alliance, conflict and political relations. In both Tables 10.2  and 10 .3, the results for the non-OECD country pairs are largely consistent with those in Tables  10.2 and 10 .3, terrorist incidents within countries reduce trade in model 3 (without dyad fixed effects), but the effect disappears in model 4 (after controlling for dyad fixed effects). In contrast, bilateral terrorist attacks now have a statistically significant negative impact on bilateral trade flows in model 4 (with dyad fixed effects) of both Tables 10.2 and 10.3. According to the estimates, a doubling in the number of bilateral attacks leads to a decline in bilateral trade flows by about 5 percent. Once we control for country pair heterogeneity, dyadic terrorist attacks reduce bilateral trade flows in country pairs that involve at least one advanced economy.
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As noted, we lag the independent variables one year to allow time for terrorist attacks to affect trade contracts and to control for possible reverse causality. One may wonder whether this modeling choice makes a difference to the results. When we re-estimate all the models in Tables 10.1-10.3 using contemporaneous independent variables, all the results remain consistent, except that the significant impact bilateral attacks for one advanced economy country pair now becomes statistically insignificant. 3 Overall, the econometric evidence in this analysis supports the conclusion that the effect of terrorism on bilateral trade is not always negative, as perceived by the public and presented in the literature. The effect is sensitive to development stages and, particularly, country pair heterogeneity. Most troubling is the fact that the effect of bilateral terrorist attacks, which should be highly significant and negative according to the theoretical logic in the literature, is only significant in some particular model specification.
WHY TERRORISM MAY NOT REDUCE BILATERAL TRADE
Econometric evidence in this analysis does not support the view in the literature that terrorism reduces bilateral trade. So what explains the inconsistency between evidence and logic? One empirical possibility is that all existing analyses fail to distinguish terrorist attacks in terms of severity. Events that are hoaxes and attacks that take lives should have very different implications for traders, but they are lumped together and treated with equal weight in analysis. This data lumping, however, should not have caused our finding that bilateral terrorist attacks increase trade by a significant economic magnitude. It is hard to imagine that even minor terrorist actions should be good for the economy at large, even though certain counter-terrorism-related businesses may boom.
The issue is probably more theoretical than empirical. There are several possible conjectures. First, consumers, producers and traders are rational economic agents. Their consumption and business decisions depend on their ability to anticipate risks. Their decisions and behavior are most likely modified ex ante where terrorist attacks are anticipated; but their behavior is most likely modified ex post where terrorist attacks are unanticipated. Terrorist events need to be distinguished if we are to estimate their ex post effect on trade. To the extent that agents overanticipate the risks ex ante, they may expand consumption and business ex post. Second, terrorism tends to concentrate in particular geographic hot spots (Braithewaite and Li, 2007) . In these hot spot countries, trade is likely to suffer, but the effect has already been taking place for a long time. Additional new attacks in the long-existing terrorism hot spots are not likely to have any large further impact on economic behavior, as their costs have been anticipated and internalized and trade levels have been suppressed for a long time already. If one were to estimate the immediate impact of terrorist attacks on trade, as is currently done, there is unlikely to be supporting evidence. This does not mean that terrorism does not reduce trade, but that the effect is localized, and over the long run.
Third, existing research has failed to consider the gigantic magnitude of international trade in the global economy and the huge opportunity cost of private agents and governments stopping trade to evade terrorism. Indeed, most analysts appear to agree that the contemporary global economy is probably the most integrated in history (see, for example, Frankel, 2000) . As the global economy becomes more integrated, it also becomes more competitive. Businesses that locate elsewhere to avoid terrorism may find their competitors snatch their abandoned market. More and more national governments liberalize their economies to expand international trade and investment in order to increase national economic growth. The pressures to maintain trade and keep commerce functioning smoothly are high. Indeed, more than $1.4 billion worth of goods cross the borders of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries every day (McDonald, 2002) . In 2001 alone, cargo vessels offloaded roughly 18 million 40-foot long cargo containers at American ports, often in single batches as large as 8000. Ports and border crossings around the world have similarly experienced an increasing volume of daily shipping and trucking activities. Even though terrorist events occur, catastrophic ones are rare. For profit-oriented firms that operate in an increasingly competitive global market, the cost of abandoning trade due to terrorism may far exceed its benefit. Governments also face the mounting pressure of balancing between counter-terrorist measures and expanding trade. These pressures are reflected in the fact that the US stock market quickly bounced back to the pre-9/11 level. To the extent that terrorist attacks lead to temporary delays in trade, we probably should expect to see a quick bounce-back and recovery in trade volume right after terrorist attacks. The statistical findings here may have reflected this trade recovery phenomenon.
Overall the econometric evidence is too weak to support the view that transnational terrorism on average reduces bilateral trade flows. This does not mean that terrorism does not reduce trade. Even at the aggregate level, bilateral terrorist attacks still reduce trade among country pairs that involve at least one advanced economy. Most likely the effect of terrorism on trade is localized and depends on context.
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